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Geopolitical Threats to Oil and the  
Functioning of the International Oil Market 
Giacomo Luciani 
1. Resource  nationalism 
There is no easy and immediate connection between 
resource nationalism or political instability and global 
supply of oil and gas. This is emphatically not 
because political developments are irrelevant for 
influencing oil and gas supplies, but because this 
influence is highly variable and unpredictable. 
Political factors act as one of the elements which 
prevent the oil and gas upstream industry from 
behaving in a perfectly economic-rational way. 
Therefore political considerations should not be 
counted as the primary determinants of the oil and 
gas markets, but should be one of the factors 
entering into the consideration of political leaders 
when they look at those industries. 
The existence of conditions of financial stability and 
growth – motivating the transformation of a physical 
asset, such as oil and gas in the ground, into financial 
assets, or infrastructural/industrial investment – is 
crucially important in determining the attitude of 
producing countries towards the desirable level of 
production and exports. Financial instability, 
negative returns on financial assets and 
protectionism against the oil producing countries’ 
industrial exports all contribute to supporting the 
view that it is best to keep oil and/or gas in the 
ground. 
Similarly, expectations about the future level of oil 
and gas prices also influence political attitudes 
towards oil and gas production and exports. If the 
market expects that supply will become scarcer in the 
face of growing demand, then the incentive to slow 
down production and exports is increased. The 
adoption of aggressive policies aimed at 
decarbonisation and energy efficiency may have an 
ambivalent effect: there may be a negative 
announcement effect, because producers will fear 
demand destruction and invest less in expanding or 
maintaining capacity; and a positive market effect, 
when demand is effectively reduced, ceteris paribus. 
Hence the policy indication is not to entertain 
policy objectives which cannot realistically be 
reached, and emphasise cooperation and 
pragmatism rather than confrontation and 
maximalism. 2 | Giacomo Luciani 
2. Military  threats 
Historical experience on oil supply disruption due to 
armed conflict has shown that oil and gas 
infrastructure is more resilient to armed conflicts than 
normally expected. Significant damage happens in the 
immediate vicinity of combat zones and in the rare 
cases in which one side gains control over the 
installations of the enemy and sabotages them. 
Interstate wars have decreased in recent decades, 
while asymmetric conflicts involving non-state actors 
(including civil wars) have not. Civil wars cause only 
limited damage to installations, but hinder 
investments. Conflicts can therefore disrupt the 
normal course of oil and gas upstream production and 
thus prevent the optimal production level being 
reached. The solution is primarily to encourage 
producers to invest in reserve (unused) capacity and, 
secondarily, to maintain stocks. The key producing 
country in this context has historically been Saudi 
Arabia, which has also maintained the most 
significant cushion of unused capacity – at substantial 
investment cost. 
3.  Restrictions of passage 
It is normally thought that the most dramatic situation 
would be the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Our 
analysis has shown that closing the Strait is not easily 
accomplished and in any case a good part of the Gulf 
production could be evacuated from other ports of the 
region, and that the shortage of crude oil could be 
made up thanks to strategic stocks under the IEA 
frame. The recommendation in this respect is to 
maintain readiness to reorient oil flows as required 
(primarily through the East-West pipeline in Saudi 
Arabia). The burden of this task falls primarily on the 
oil producing countries. At the same time it is 
necessary to maintain the military capability to reopen 
the Strait of Hormuz, in the unlikely event that it 
might effectively be closed. 
The European Union should aim at mitigating the 
danger of closure of other critical sea lanes which 
might be caused by navigation accidents through 
congested passages; the most critical situation being 
that of the Turkish Straits. An option would be to seek 
a revision of the Montreux Convention of 1936, to 
allow for the imposition of size limitations and 
passage charges on tankers, to discourage free riding 
and create conditions for the commercial development 
of pipeline by-passes. The EU should aim at 
facilitating investment in infrastructure adapted to 
reduce the danger of accidents  and vulnerability 
by offering financial incentives and promoting even 
more stringent regulations for oil and chemical 
tankers. 
4a.  Functioning of the International Oil 
Markets 
Our analysis has pointed to the unsatisfactory 
functioning of the international oil markets and the 
resulting uncertainty and volatility in oil prices as the 
main security threat for future oil supplies. Price 
volatility and unpredictability is at the heart of the 
feeling of insecurity that is perceived by European 
citizens and governments, while in fact physical 
availability, especially for oil, has never been in 
question. For gas, episodes of supply interruptions 
have been due to disputes related to pipeline 
transmission. 
Price volatility and unpredictability discourages 
investment at all stages of the industry and increases 
the danger of supply interruptions. 
The root cause of price volatility is the rigidity of 
demand and supply in the short term. These are 
impossible to change, and can only be alleviated 
through encouraging the accumulation of larger 
stocks. 
However, our analysis has pointed to the possibility of 
improving the situation by increasing the relative 
weight of trading in real (‘wet’) oil barrels rather than 
future paper contracts and their multiple derivatives. 
This very much depends on the will and initiative of 
major oil producing countries, but the EU should 
engage in a dialogue to encourage the adoption of 
better price discovery methods.  
The EU can also move in the direction of shifting the 
emphasis of price discovery from spot to forward 
pricing (normally less volatile) by imposing a time lag 
between the announcement and the implementation of 
price changes at the retail oil products level. The 
possibility of agreeing with major oil producers on a 
flexible and adjustable price band should also be 
studied, to avoid price bubbles and/or spikes. 
The management of stocks is crucially important for 
containing price volatility. Strategic stocks are not 
useful in this respect because they are not supposed to 
be used for market intervention. Rather, the EU 
should establish a public agency to invest in larger 
storage facilities to be offered for use to oil producers 
(be they national or international oil companies) at 
low cost. The agency should be empowered to issue 
certificates convertible in physical barrels: oil 
deposited into the storage would be exchanged for 
such certificates, and certificates could be used to 
withdraw oil from storage. Stored oil certificates 
should be designed and regulated in such a way that 
they will be accepted as collateral by financial 
institutions. The availability of an ‘oil bank’ of this 
kind would encourage investment in capacity 
additions in anticipation of demand, thus contributing 
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The issue of demand security, which the producing 
countries have raised with increased frequency in 
connection with demands that they increase 
investment in additional capacity, may be approached 
through the encouragement of longer-term supply 
contracts based on take-or-play clauses – similar to 
those long practised in the gas industry. This would 
serve the purpose of guaranteeing those producers that 
are willing to invest in unused capacity against the 
danger that they might be squeezed out of the market 
and forced into the position of residual supplier, 
whereby they would be called to absorb all 
fluctuations in physical demand. 
Another way to approach the same problem is to 
encourage vertical reintegration. Specifically, the 
national oil companies of major producing countries 
should be encouraged to invest downstream in the 
European markets establishing their own distribution 
networks, so as to acquire direct access to the final 
consumer. 
In summary, we have proposed six key policies to 
address the issue of volatility and its negative 
consequences on supply security: 
•  Encourage the freer trading of major crude oil 
streams, notably those from the Gulf 
o  Establish ‘crude oil exchanges’ 
o  Based on auctions of forward contracts for 
different qualities of crude 
o  Allowing secondary trading 
o  Preferably based in ‘third’ countries and close 
to key loading/unloading points: Ceyhan, 
Alexandria, Bahrain; Trieste, Rotterdam 
•  Increase reliance on long-term pricing 
o  Impose an obligation to fuel retailers to 
announce price changes with 3 months 
advance notice, and a minimum lag of 15 
days between one announcement and the next 
o  Rationale: retailers can hedge their risk, 
individual consumers cannot 
o  This would encourage retailers to resist price 
increases and transfer price decreases to final 
consumers 
•  Enforce an internationally agreed price band 
o  Declaratory approach is not sufficient, but 
combination with previous proposals may be 
more credible 
o  In a context in which oil is a source of oil 
revenue for both sides, mutual revenue 
guarantees are possible and would strengthen 
the credibility of the band 
•  In essence, governments of producing and 
consuming countries would exchange a 
collar whereby if prices go above upper 
strike producers transfer revenue to 
consumers, and if price goes below lower 
strike the opposite holds  
•  Manage stocks (see point 5.1.4) 
o  Increase oil storage capacity in proximity to 
market and establish an oil lending window 
o  Rationale: producers would be encouraged to 
produce a bit more and store, and to invest in 
capacity increases 
o  Oil stored is more secure than oil in the 
ground 
o  Japan has set the example 
o  Storage to be built at major loading points – 
reinforces proposal for crude oil exchanges 
•  Offer demand security through take or pay 
contracts 
o  A formula that has given stability to the gas 
market for a long time 
o  Unpopular with the EU because of priority to 
competition: however if no security of 
demand is offered, why should producing 
countries invest in additional capacity? 
o  China is showing the way 
o  Linked to storage and long-term trading 
proposal  
•  Encourage vertical integration 
o  Encourage national oil companies of the oil 
producing countries to integrate downstream 
in refining and marketing in the importing 
countries 
o  Rationale: producers will not fall short in 
supplies to refineries and distribution 
netwroks which they own  
4b. Strategic  stocks 
Our analysis of strategic stocks evidenced the 
crippling ambiguity of the rules that govern their 
utilisation. In actual practice, strategic stocks have 
been used very rarely and have had a very limited 
impact. They have not prevented or helped containing 
major price oscillations, which are at the heart of 
supply insecurity. 
We do not conclude that strategic stocks should be 
abandoned, but their importance should be revisited in 
favour of a more flexible policy of encouragement to 
the accumulation of industry stocks, as discussed in 
the previous paragraph. 4 | Giacomo Luciani 
The desirable size of strategic stocks should be based 
on the N-1 standard (i.e. be designed to compensate 
for the duration of one year for the disappearance due 
to war of all exports from the single largest global 
exporter, which today is Saudi Arabia; or of all 
exports to the EU of the single largest supplier of the 
EU, which today is Russia) keeping in mind that: a) 
not all uses of oil are strategically important and 
demand management should contribute to addressing 
supply shortfalls and b) the EU is not the only 
affected importer. In this light, currently existing 
stocks are quite sufficient. 
5.  Refinery localisation determinants 
and evolving oil product 
specifications 
The principal issues facing European refined product 
supply are: 
•  Europe has continued to increase its reliance on 
imports of refined diesel and kerosene products 
from areas including Russia and India and 
presently European refineries remain unsuitable 
for producing the refined products demanded by 
the European market  
•  There is a declining demand for the excess 
gasoline that is produced by European refineries 
both in domestic and in export markets which 
further exacerbates the imbalance that presently 
exists 
•  Adhering to environmentally motivated and even 
seemingly subtle product specification changes 
presents a challenge for the European refinery 
industry in that such modifications are 
immensely costly and time consuming and do not 
add to the capital of the existing refinery. Such 
costs make investment conditions within Europe 
challenging 
•  Regulatory uncertainty with regard to future 
carbon costs and the economic and the technical 
impact of proposed legislation on refineries are 
issues that continue to stifle refinery investment 
and increase investment uncertainty 
Our analysis has shown that these problems 
significantly affect Europe’s security of oil supply and 
must be addressed in their own merit. In other words, 
security of oil products supply is not the same thing as 
security of crude oil supplies. 
The following remedies are proposed: 
1.  Firstly, to intensify the drive to synergize 
worldwide oil product specifications to facilitate 
the trade of refined products. The adoption of a 
more global and standardised refined product 
quality has made tentative progress with the 
creation of new refineries in the Middle East and 
India, which can process fuel in order to meet 
European fuel specification standards. More 
however needs to be done. 
2.  A pragmatic shift to importing refined products 
at the expense of crude may facilitate serving the 
imbalance in European consumption of oil 
products but would further diminish security of 
supply by reducing flexibility and substitutability 
of suppliers.  
3.  There presently exists a substantive differential 
in the taxation levied on diesel and gasoline 
automotive fuels to the point where diesel is 
approximately 20% cheaper than gasoline at the 
pump. Such differential should be reconsidered; 
if it were to be reduced this would result in 
increased consumer demand for gasoline cars and 
subsequently alleviate the demand constraints for 
diesel over time. 
4.  Greater coordination is needed between 
refineries and legislators in the setting of targets 
for the industry and the safeguarding of the 
indigenous refining industry. 
5.  More transparency is needed in the long-term 
pricing of carbon. Refineries are long-term, 
highly capital intensive projects and a common 
criticism from the refining industry at present is 
the hindrance of investment through the 
uncertainty of how much they will have to pay 
for CO2 emissions. 
6.  Consideration must be given to the unavoidable 
fact that if refineries are going to make the 
products that the market wants then they will 
have to increase emissions. Refining is a highly 
energy intensive activity. 
7.  The continuing and accelerating introduction of 
biofuels in EU road fuels may help inasmuch as 
it would mitigate demand for conventional 
automotive fuels in the European Union. 
Biofuels, if produced in significant volumes, 
could displace trade for other products. Bio-
diesel could reduce diesel imports while ethanol 
would cause an increase of gasoline exports. 
While the former is desirable, the latter 
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